Finding 08: Asymmetric EdDSA Uses Unsalted Commitment
EdDSA commitment uses unsalted SHA-256, enabling rainbow-table-style precomputation against fixed nonce structures.
Read the writeup →Vulnerability research, detection engineering, and applied cryptography.
EdDSA commitment uses unsalted SHA-256, enabling rainbow-table-style precomputation against fixed nonce structures.
Read the writeup →Offline-ECDSA path accepts unverified signature shares.
Read the writeup →Unbounded alloca() on attacker-sized range-proof input stack-overflows the verifier.
Integer overflow during quadratic-residue ZKP deserialization.
Read the writeup →Fiat-Shamir transcript truncation in MtA.
Read the writeup →MtA batch verification uses 8 bits of randomness, allowing forged batches with non-negligible probability.
Read the writeup →Heap overflow in destructor path.
Read the writeup →Ring-Pedersen parameter generation accepts degenerate values.
Read the writeup →Two SSRFs in the same platform via different code paths (webhook callbacks + image processor). The systemic pattern matters more than either finding.
Read the writeup →Cross-project access to SQL optimizer artifacts via predictable object IDs.
Read the writeup →403 vs 404 oracle on /v1/project/<name> enumerates the entire managed-services customer base.
/v1/userauth timing differential distinguishes registered vs unregistered emails.